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Along with the exploding attention to globalization, issues of global justice have
become central elements in political philosophy. After decades in which debates
were dominated by a state-centric paradigm, current debates in political philosophy
also address issues of global inequality, global poverty, and themoral foundations of
international law. As recent events have demonstrated, these issues also play an im-
portant role in the practice of international law. In fields such as peace and security,
economic integration, environmental law, and human rights, international lawyers
are constantly confronted with questions of global justice and international legit-
imacy. This special issue contains four papers which address an important element
of this emerging debate on cosmopolitan global justice, with much relevance for
international law: the principle of sovereign equality, global economic inequality,
and environmental law.
The political–philosophical interest in global justice and international law re-
ceived an important stimulus with the publication of John Rawls’s The Law of
Peoples.1 In this book Rawls claims to extend the principles of justice for domestic
society to international relations for a society of peoples.2 Rawls describes the Law
of Peoples ‘as a particular political conception of right and justice that applies to the
principles and norms of international law and practice’, and the Society of Peoples
as ‘all those peoples who follow the ideals and principles of the Law of Peoples in
their mutual relations’.3 Characteristic of Rawls’s approach in both in the domestic
and international theory of justice is the use of thought experiments involving a
fictional deliberative forum, the original position. To ensure that this hypothetical
deliberation is fair and equal, the parties in the deliberation exist behind ‘a veil of
ignorance’ depriving them of knowledge about themselves, and thus preventing
* Roland Pierik is Assistant Professor of Political Theory, Tilburg University; Wouter Werner is Associate
Professor of Public International Law, Institute of Public International Law, Utrecht University. This article
and the articles following by Kok-Chor Tan, Thomas Mertens, Thomas Pogge, and Simon Caney were
the outcome of a symposium on ‘Cosmopolitism, Global Justice, and International Law’, held in the Grotius
Centre for International Legal Studies (TheHague campus) inApril 2005. The symposiumwasmadepossible
withfinancial support from the LawFaculty of LeidenUniversity, theCornelis vanVollenhoven Foundation,
and the Grotius Centre.
1. J. Rawls, The Law of Peoples (1999).
2. Ibid., at 3, 9.
3. Ibid., at 3.
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them from being biased towards their own interests according to their own social,
historical contingency and conception of the good.
There is also, however, an important difference in Rawls’s theory between the
domestic and the international context. In the domestic context, individuals decide
behind a veil of ignorance on the basic principles of justice. In the international
context, this role is assigned to representatives of peoples (or rather states). Moreover,
in the domestic context, all citizens have an equal say in the determination of the
basic principles of justice of that society. This notion of equality is not applied to
peoples or states. Rather, in The Law of Peoples Rawls makes an a priori distinction
between different types of peoples: reasonable liberal peoples, decent hierarchical
peoples, outlaw states, and burdened societies.4
Since the Law of Peoples is developed out of, and in line with, his liberal idea of
domestic justice, as presented in A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism,5 it only
allows reasonable liberal peoples to decide on the principles that should govern
international relations. In this sense, The Law of Peoples can be read as a theory
of the foreign policies that reasonable liberal states should adopt. Rawls develops
the theory in three stages. The first stage identifies the set of principles on which
liberal peoples can agree among themselves as the basis of fair co-operation in a
society of liberal peoples. Perhaps surprisingly, Rawls suggests that representatives
of liberal peoples in the original global position will agree to adopt principles
that come close to somebasic principles that underlie current international law: the
independenceandequalityofstates, thepactasunt servandaprinciple, theprohibition
on intervention, the right of self-defence, and theobligation tohonourhuman rights
and justice in war. Moreover, Rawls argues, peoples have a duty to assist burdened
societies lacking the resources to sustain just regimes.6
In the second stage, the way in which liberal peoples should deal with other
types of peoples is set out. Here Rawls argues that liberal peoples should respect
and recognize decent hierarchical peoples as ‘equal participating members in good
standing of the Society of Peoples’, but should exclude outlaw states and burdened
societies.7 In the thirdandfinal stage,Rawls addresses theway inwhichwell-ordered
peoples (liberal and decent peoples) should deal with outlaw states – states that
‘refuse to complywith a reasonable Lawof Peoples’ – and burdened societies lacking
thebasic resources tobecomewell ordered.8 Hedescribeshowwell-ordered societies
4. In Rawls’s description, liberal peoples are governed by reasonable and just constitutional democratic regimes
that protect basic rights and liberties of all citizens, prioritizes these rights and liberties over claims of the
general good or perfectionist values, and assures for all citizens access to primary goods to enable them to
make effective use of their freedoms. Decent hierarchical peoples fall short of liberal standards but satisfy two
criteria. First, they are peaceful, do not have aggressive aims, and respect the independence of other states.
Second, they respect human rights, have a ‘decent consultation hierarchy’ (the elected bodies represent all
the subgroups), and their officials operate in the honest belief that their law is guided by a ‘common good
idea of justice’. Outlaw states are states that refuse to comply with the Law of Peoples. Burdened societies are
societies whose historical, economic, and cultural conditions make it difficult, if not impossible, to become
well ordered on their own. Rawls, supra note 1, at 14, 64–5.
5. J. Rawls,A Theory of Justice (1971); idem, Political Liberalism (1993); idem, supra note 1, at 3.
6. Rawls, supra note 1, at 37. Rawls stresses that this set of principles is incomplete and that other principles
might be added.
7. Ibid., at 59.
8. Ibid., at 90.
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may defend themselves against outlaw regimes and help bring about reformwithin
these regimes in the long run and how they can assist burdened societies to help
bring them into the Society of well-ordered Peoples.9
Several international lawyers have criticized Rawls’s theory (and its adoption in
liberal internationalism) as being too exclusive. His emphasis on universal prin-
ciples, combined with the a priori distinction between states, has reminded in-
ternational legal scholars of the logic of inclusion and exclusion that underlay
many nineteenth-century conceptions of international law. In those conceptions,
theuniversal validity of human rightswas combinedwith a differentiationbetween
‘civilized states’ andother types of states or societies (suchas ‘barbaric states’, ‘savage
communities’, ‘criminal states’, ‘nonage communities’, or ‘insane communities’).10
Civilized states did have the responsibility of ensuring respect for universal values
and could do so in a legal order that gave them corresponding special powers. In a
similar fashion, adoption of the Rawlsian framework would necessarily lead to an
expansion of a liberal Empire, or ‘Empire’s law’. In his critique of the way in which
some contemporary scholars use Kantianmorality in international legal discourse,
Koskenniemi has argued that adoption of abstract universalism necessarily leads to
expansionist politics:
Because reason(incontrast topreference) isuniversal, thesecommandsenjoyuniversal
validity. That is to say, every thinking person, State or people would choose them from
behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ . . . It follows that a person, group, or State that does not
share them is not only of another opinion (or preference) but has made a mistake
about something that that person, group or State should think rational for itself too.
Universalizability in theory leads automatically to expansion as practice.11
Cosmopolitan scholars, however, have argued the opposite. They have argued
that Rawls’s theory takes the equality between states too seriously and ends up by
defending principles of international justice that are very much like those defen-
ded in mainstream international law literature. Or, to put it another way, Rawls’s
theory of international justice is set aside as a body of rules ‘for a vanished West-
phalian world’.12 Indeed, cosmopolitans have criticized The Law of Peoples as being
‘unrawlsian’, because its principles of international justice are so different from the
liberal and egalitarian spirit of the principles of domestic justice. Their basic point
of departure is that all human beings do belong to a single community, and that this
shared community should be cultivated.13 Cosmopolitans alsouseRawls’s domestic
original position, although in a radicalized form.14 Nationality is seen as just an-
other ‘deep contingency’ (like genetic endowment, race, gender, and social class in
9. Ibid., at 92–3, 106.
10. M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960 (2001);
A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (2004); G. Simpson, Great Powers and
Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order (2004).
11. Koskenniemi, supra note 10, at 490.
12. A. Buchanan, ‘Rawls’s Law of Peoples: Rules for a VanishedWestphalianWorld’, (2000) 110 Ethics 697.
13. P. Kleingeld and E. Brown, ‘Cosmopolitanism’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2002).
14. C. Beitz,Political Theory and International Relations (1979); idem, ‘Cosmopolitan Ideals andNational Sentiment’,
(1983) 10 The Journal of Philosophy 591; T. Pogge, Realizing Rawls (1989); idem, ‘Cosmopolitanism and Sover-
eignty’, (1992) 103 Ethics 48; idem, ‘An Egalitarian Law of Peoples’, (1994) 23 (3) Philosophy and Public Affairs
195.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 27 Apr 2011 IP address: 130.37.129.78
682 ROLAND PIERIK AND WOUTER WERNER
the domestic theory), one more potential basis of institutional inequalities that are
inescapable and present from birth.15 And since there is no reason within Rawls’s
model to treatnationality differently, cosmopolitanspropose a single global original
position for the international domain in which every world citizen is represented,
as an alternative to Rawls’s version where only representatives of peoples are rep-
resented. The most important implication of this alternative set-up of the original
position is that different principles of international justice would be chosen. The
cosmopolitan principles of international justicewould bemore in linewith Rawls’s
principle of domestic justice than would Rawls’s own principles of international
justice. For example, Rawls’s conception of domestic justice defends an extensive
catalogue of liberal rights, including the right of equal representation, democratic
participation, freedom of speech, while the set of rights in his conception of inter-
national justice only defends a limited set of basic human rights, providing basic
security and subsistence.
In thisway, cosmopolitismchallengesbothRawls’s theoryandsomeassumptions
underlying international law. The most obvious challenge concerns the principle
of sovereign equality. While several international lawyers have spoken out against
Rawls’s distinction between different types of states, some cosmopolitans have ar-
gued for an even stronger differentiation. Thus, in his contribution to this issue,
Kok-Chor Tan argues that Rawls sacrifices liberal rights and liberties to toleration
in order to present a Law of Peoples that is also acceptable to decent peoples. Rawls
argues that it would be disrespectful to nonliberal decent peoples and an infringe-
ment of the liberal principle of toleration if the Law of Peopleswere to includemore
than the basic human rights. Tan replies that, given theway inwhichRawls’s theory
is constructed, Rawls’s priority of tolerance over the protection of liberal rights is
misguided. After all, the Law of Peoples is presented as an extension to a Society of
Peoples of a liberal conception of justice for a domestic regime. Therefore it should
‘remain steadfast’ in its liberal commitment to the protection of individual freedom
and rights, for example of dissenting individuals in decent but nonliberal societies.
Tan thus concludes that even within Rawls’s ownmethod of constructing the Law of
Peoples, it ought to include an extensive catalogue of liberal rights, most probably
implying that Rawls’s Law of Peoples is unacceptable to decent peoples.
In a critical response Thomas Mertens questions the exclusion of decent
but nonliberal peoples from the Society of Peoples. On the basis of a Kantian
understanding of Enlightenment as a perpetual challenge, Mertens argues that
cosmopolitans should take the notion of tolerationmore seriously. Tan andMertens
do not necessarily disagree about the fact that there is a tension within (Rawls’s)
liberalism between the emphasis on liberal rights and the duty of tolerance to
nonliberal ways of political organization. They disagree which of the two values
should prevail. Tan’s cosmopolitan’s interpretation emphasizes individual liberties
and freedoms, useful to criticize actual practices and institutions, even those of
liberal peoples, for example the practice of capital punishment in the United States.
15. Pogge, Realizing Rawls, supra note 14, at 247; for a similar claim see Beitz, ‘Cosmopolitan Ideals’, supra note
14, at 595.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 27 Apr 2011 IP address: 130.37.129.78
COSMOPOLITISM, GLOBAL JUSTICE, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 683
Mertens’s interpretation, following Locke and Spinoza, emphasizes toleration as the
central value inRawlsian liberalismand, consequently, defends an inclusive attitude
towards nonliberal decent peoples.
A second cosmopolitan challenge to Rawls’s Law of Peoples concerns the issue of
socioeconomic redistribution. Central to Rawls’s concept of domestic justice is the
difference principle, claiming that income andwealth in a society are to be distributed
equally unless an unequal distribution is to the advantage of the worst-off in soci-
ety.16 In his extension of the principles of justice for domestic society to the Society
of Peoples, Rawls abandons the strong egalitarian principle to support burdened
societies − the internationally worst-off participants. The concept of international
justice only includes a people’s ‘duty to assist other peoples living under unfavour-
able conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political regime’.17 Rawls
argues that, unlike in the domestic case, inequalities in the international realm are
not ipso factounjust.Moreover,hedoesnotprimarily identify ‘burdened’with lacking
material resources, but, instead,with the lackof ‘political andcultural traditions, the
human capital and know-how and, often, the material and technological resources
needed to be well-ordered’.18 Indeed, he asserts that no society is so deprived of
natural resources that theywould be unable to becomewell orderedwere they to be
rationally and reasonably governed:
The causes of the wealth of a people and the forms it takes lie in their political
culture and in the religious, philosophical, andmoral traditions that support the basic
structure of their political and social institutions, as well as in the industriousness and
co-operative talents of its members, all supported by their political virtues.19
Rawls only demands assistance for burdened societies in overcoming their unfa-
vourable conditions, that is, in lifting them above a minimum threshold to be able
to ‘manage their own affairs reasonably and rationally and eventually to become
members of the Society ofwell-ordered Peoples’.20 Thus assistance should primarily
be focused on building a well-functioning domestic basic structure of society and
its major social and political institutions.21 Of course, this might imply dispensing
funds but also an emphasis on human rights, to force ineffective regimes to take the
well-being of all their citizens into account.22
Rawls thus presupposes a two-level conception of the international society,
sharply distinguishing the domestic society from the international Society of
Peoples.23 On the domestic level, governments have a primary responsibility for
thewell-being of their citizens and the protection of human rights,while the system
of international relations only provides a background against which domestic soci-
eties can function and co-operate. Cosmopolitans reject this two-level conception
16. Rawls, supra note 5, at 303.
17. Rawls, Theory of Justice, supra note 1, at 37.
18. ‘Not all [burdened] societies are poor, anymore than all well-ordered societies are wealthy’. Ibid., at 106.
19. Ibid., at 108.
20. Ibid., at 111.
21. See for an elaboration of a Rawlsian emphasis on domestic institutions as the primary cause of thewealth of
peoples M. Risse, ‘WhatWe Owe to the Global Poor’, (2005) 9 (1–2) The Journal of Ethics 81.
22. Rawls, supra note 1, at 109.
23. C. Beitz, ‘Social and Cosmopolitan Liberalism’, (1999) 75 International Affairs 515.
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of international society, and start from the assumption that ‘every human being has
a right to have his or her basic interests met, regardless of nationality or citizen-
ship’24 and ‘that every human being has a global stature as an ultimate unit ofmoral
concern’.25
Thus in his contribution to this issue Thomas Pogge focuses on the globally
worst-off individuals, the 2,735 million human beings living in our world today
who lack safe food and water, clothing, shelter, basic medical care, and basic educa-
tion. In his analysis of the causes of this severe poverty, he refutes Rawls’s ‘purely
domestic poverty thesis’. Instead, he argues that poverty is caused by a global in-
stitutional order, consisting of international and supranational organizations such
as the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and the World
Bank. Moreover, he asserts that only minor reforms of this institutional design are
necessary to avoid this massive poverty, but that these reforms are ‘blocked by the
governments of the affluent countries, which are ruthlessly advancing their own
interests and those of their corporations and citizens, designing and imposing a
global institutional order that, continually and foreseeably, produces vast excesses
of severe poverty and premature poverty deaths’. From these assertions, Pogge de-
rives a negative duty of affluent societies and their citizens not to contribute to
the imposition of this unjust institutional order, and to support structural reform
towards a more just global institutional order.
Finally, Simon Caney’s contribution to this issue discusses global environmental
problems.This isanissuethathasnotbeendiscussed inRawls’sTheLawofPeoples, but
which has become a dominant topic in current international law and international
relations. As mentioned above, Rawls emphasizes domestic institutions, thereby
ignoring possible border-crossing effects of domestic activities, for example climate
change caused by (domestic) human activities. Caney examines what may be the
fairest way of dealing with global climate change.
24. C. Jones,Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism (1999).
25. T. Pogge,World Poverty and Human Rights (2002).
